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IN TP.E SUPREI1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
r'Rl:J:::O JOES, INC., a Utah 
cr-rpora tion, DONALD VAUGHN 




:OLLIS Y. P!::?.'{, GORDO~; 1-l.i'.LL 
nd KENi'lETl'l HOSTETTER, 
Defencants-
Respondents~ 
Case No. 14,515 
BRIE? OF PL1\IKTIFFS-.~'~.PPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for dagages arising out of the forcible 
e1try of the plaintiffs' leased prer;1.ises by the lessor, defendant 
Ellis Peay. It is also an action for conversion of the personal 
crop'"rty • ..1hich was located in the building on the leased premises. 
~e conversion claim was made against all of the defendants. Defen-
61nt Peay counter-claimed for rent allegedly due and unpaid. 
D2~endants Hall and Hostetter counter-claimed against the plaintiff 
ac': cross-claimed agai:1st defendant Peay to quiet title to the 
~rsonal property in question. Hall and Hostetter also cross-
2 hi~·2d ao3.inst Peay for indeEmification in the event any judgment 
:h:J'Jld be entered a]ainst ther'1. 
DISPOSITIUN I:: THE LO\·IER COURT 
?he trial court, Judge J. Robert Bullock, presiding, dismissed 
'I 
::i th p-rcj uc~ice e_;:ct..:pt. that it entered judgment for 
·.,::.~.OD coc the:: c1e£·~;oc12nt Pea;· against the plaintiff for the 
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1' -~ 
and e!lc:c:: jrJd<;rc:.c;tt c-<S-'-i:;st the dcf~:nrL1nts in the cnnunt prayen 
for tL-2 forci:J::::: 8nt..:~-T l.J·.r t~12 cJctc~ndant l'eCly und fo:- th2 ~,:ror, 
rent reduced fr2m $1?5),00 to $:i54.8C1 -,s reflr:>ctivc o{' the crc(r":-
past c·_:~_, rent. 
I:1 th~: ?t] ~.:-::-:tati-;·.~, a~Jpel.l,J.:-:t.~ o_:.;k \.hat tl~ t.s Coc1c-= re\'2: . .-
t-.he t:-ia.l C0 1J:!:-c ,_.,'ith r-:::::;a~d ·to the forcible sntry a:H1 co::\r_::_·sl: 
cost3 of this a~peal. 
5":',\TLc·lENT OF Fi\CT3 
I:1 late Deccrr_:_,er of 1974, DorHld and ~fo'lnncc ToLcktn purchioc 
all of th~ i:tte~est in F.::-isco Joe's, Inc., a corz)orat:.:io~ ',·l:tJ.:t 
sole ?~C~.-.ivit} ~-1:iS bs:.<: .:::.he ma:nageJr,·'3Pt of a T'E'stc)_:J:-~:1: in PrJ1.'J, 
Utah, ~hich bore the na~e of the cor~oration. 
:•_1.:;:; of tlt 
- 0./, _ r ,111 1 j .J..C I' l'J I 1- ,-,_-, lc 
- ')-
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l!!S~ provided that Tolman would pay $400.00 per month rent, 
~ginning on January 1, 1975. The provisions of the lease provide 
that a five day notice-to-quit may be given if the rent is more 
~an fifteen days delinquent. The lease also provided for a 
$450.00 payment on March 15, 1975, as a deposit for the last 
ronth's rent. Tolman made the January rent payment but did not 
~~e the February or March payments. 
Because the business was unprofitable, Tolman closed it and 
b:gan looking for a purchaser with the help of a real estate 
~ency. On ~arch 5, 1976, Tolman had a discussion with defendant 
~~. the contents of which are discuted. In any event, Tolman 
conti:1u2d in pe3ce ful possession of the premises until c·!arch 12, 
1975. On that dat'c:, Peay entered the premises and had a locksmith 
mm~ to change the locks on the building, thus excluding the 
plaintiff from possession of the premises and the personal property 
•.;ithin the building. Peay alleges that the lock-chainging was 
cione for the purposes of security but never explains the failure 
~provide the plaintiffs with a key to the premises. 
Respondents Hall and Hostetter subsequently leased the 
premises fro;c defendant Peay and purportedly entered into a 
~rchase contract for the personal property. In early April of 
1975, plaintiff Tolman informed both Hall and Hostetter that he 
~Mci the personal property in the restaurant. They responded by 
that they had purchased it from Peay and that Tolman 
·~'JL: h.:cvc co solve an:,: problems with him (Peay). 
The defendants have never returned any of the personal 
rty belanging to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have 
-3-
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Appellants' c':ltoO~l.tion on appeal is that th,:c trial court 
erred o.s a mati:.er o:' lo: . ., in failing t0 find that the abo·:e fac:s 
consti tnted forci~lc c'r:try by the defendant Prcily emu convcersior. 
bv all of the defendants. Appellan~s believe that the Utah lH 
on these two subjects is clear and that the trial court vras 
sir:'.?lY incorrect in its holding. 
POIN'l.' I 
THE TRII\L CO\Jl'.'I ERi,ED IN FAILElG TO FI:-JD Ilii\T TUE DSFENDA': 
PE_:\Y \•JAS GUIL'.LY OF FORCIBLY ECJTRY. 
by the clear ~eight of the evidence ~~ trial. ·j,he evidence 
sho·,;ed that respondent Ellis Peay took possession of the leas'•' 
prop{;2r_·ty ,,.,;it"hout the app2llants • pc~rl.issio:t or: :.·;rithout follmtir,: 
the legal requirements of Utah's t,orc ible En try and Detainer i• 
U.C.C\. § 78-JS-l, et seq. Appellants belie•1e that the error 
CODiJlaincd ·.Jf in this appeal occurred in applying the pertinen:, 
la':.' to the £acts in thls case. 
U'cah J ,C.'d has clearly defined the metho:l by \·lhich a landlc::• 
~ay dispossess a tenant whom he believes to be in arrears oo~, 
rent payments. As stated in Fr2e't~ay Park Building, Inc. v3 
States \·Jholesale Suppl,,, 22 U.2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969), the 
"forcible entry and detainer statute (§ 78-36-3, U.C.A., 195li 
fully is in possession of land." Paxto"1 '-'· Fish2r, 86 OtJh ;, 
45 P.2d 903, 906 (1935) estatlish0d that the ~orcible 
-~-
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surr~nde~ of possession by the tenant: 
Even rishtful owners should not take the law into 
th•ir own hands a~d proceed to recover oossession by 
violence, or by entry in the nighttime,.or durin~ the 
absence of the occupants ot any real property. 
3ven contractual p:-ovisions between the parties do not over-
.. -~ ~je requirements of ?roceeding in a court of law. 
"i:-:--, 3 Utah2d 419, 285 P.2d 114, (1955) the lease under which 
:~2 ca3e arose contained a provision giving the landlord the right 
J': rc:-c'1try upon the tenant's default in rent payr.ent •11ithout 
The court held that the landlord 
:J.~::! ~till not dis]Jossess the tenant without his ez;J:cess perr.tission: 
~teh has enacted Forcible Entry and Detai~er 
Stat~tcs and ~ landlord rna~' not ~~ithout the ex?=ess 
co:.coent cf a te:1ant repossess his prope.ct:,· 1-1i thout 
resorting to re2edies provided in those statutes. 
Id, at 1118. 
?e-2:-sen ''· Platt, 16 Utah2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965), the 
: "l~ -... ;,s stated eveu more clearly in the court's holding that 
cisCJ::J:;session, unless consentual, must be effected by the statutory 
·se.::s. 2'hat case, 1-;hich is almost exactly indentical to this 
:cc, c:eacly shOi·ls that t~e defendant, Peay, \vas guilty of Vlrong-
:cl 2:,':~1· '-"hen he entered the premises, had the locks changed, 
•cc: '::c:::~ ~Jossession •.vi thout permission. The law of the case, 
:·,ic:, ·.:o.s ovcerlooked by the trial court in this case, is clearly 
Our orevious decisions construing our forcible 
entr~ and detainer statute place a duty on a 
p~-s~n whether entitled to the real property in 
DL!estion oc no~, to not use force or stealth or 
f~a~d in ohtai'1i~g possession of such realty. 
s~c~ foccibl2 ~~try and detainer statute 
c~o~te3 a rig~t in a perso~ who is in actual 
~ea~cablc possession of such real ?roperty_to a 
c~ n o~ actio~ e~alnst a person who, 1n h1s 
ab3~ncu, and ~tth~ut legal process, by fo:-ce, 
-5-
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stealth or fraud, takes the ?ossession of such 
property from him. Id, at 400 P.2d 508. 
Despite the atter:1;:>ts at trial to justify Peay's behavior, it is 
crystal clear under Utah law that the acts of the defendant ~~. 
in dispossessing the plaintiffs of the leased premises, constituto. 
forcible entry as defined in Utah statute and case law. 
As seen by the Delaware Court in ~'.alcolm v. Li t.tle, 295 A.2c 
711, 713 (1972), such statutes abrogate the common la·.v right to 
expel a holdover tenant without legal ?recess: 
The common lal•l rule that the landlord may expel 
holdover tenants without process appears still to 
be followed in several states. That appears to 
have been the ectrly rule in Delctlvare. .State v. 
Stansborouqh, 1 Del.Cas 129 and 428 (1797). 
~ore rec?ntly, however, the courts of many states 
have lteld that the ·-enactr:1ent of forcible entry 
and detainer statutes has r:1.odified the common 
la<.J and that the landlo.cd, in order t.o disp~3Sess 
a tenant, must proceed by the statutes. Failure 
to proceed by such means may result in the land-
lord being liable to the tenant in damages. See, 
for example, Petersen v. Platt, 16 U.2d 330, 400 
P . 2 d 5o 7 ( 19 6 Sl;-.i\m.rc,o'6ALR 3d 1 7 7 ( 19 6 6 ) . 
The Utah Forcible Entry Statute has thus been clearly estat) 
as being the exclusive alternative to consentual surrender of 
leased or rented premises. The elements and universal scope o£ 1 
the sta.tute 1vere emphasized in Free•.-rav Park Building, Inc. v.3J 
, 190i 1 States l·lholesale Supply, 22 Utah2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778, 781, 
2nt:ry. 
! It says that "every person" '.-Jho does certain things 
is guilty of forcible entry, etc. There is no 
exception in the statute for one who may by contract ! 
be authorized to enter, or for an owner who as a mat· 
ter of law rnay have a right to the possession. 
f fordo:-
1 
facts in this case clearly SU?port a finding o 
The terms of tho lease provided for · ase oi re-entry lD c · 
default in rent payment only ~ith five days written notice . 
. . . upon five (5) days ·11ritten notice of such dcfauit 
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have the right to re-enter or re-possess the leased 
property. . . (Ex. 11.) . 
it was n~ver claimed at trial by defendant Peay that the five day 
~~itten notice was given; in fact he admitted he did not give 
that notice. (R. 237). Thus, the repossession cannot be justified 
under the terms of the lease, even if that were permitted under 
the Forcible Entry Statute. 
Nor can the repossession be justified by a claim of surrender 
oE the lease. There is no evidence of an express surrender, and 
evidence is inadequate to support a finding of a surrender by 
operation of lavl. No tangible evidence of an intent to surrender 
exists. The defendant Peay only alleges that there was an offer 
to turn over the keys to the premises by Hr. Tolman. Those keys 
~re never delivered. Had a surrender truly been effected, there 
·,wuld have been no need to change the locks and exclude the 
rightful possessors. 
The standard by which a claim of surrender must be measured 
in Utah was set in Mariani Air Products v. Gill's Tire Market, 29 
Utah2d 291, 508 P.2d 808, 810, (1973): 
a surrender will not be implied against the in-
tent of the parties, as manifested by their acts ... 
The burden is on the party, relying on a surrender 
of a lease, to prove it; and the proof must be clear 
where the surrender is to be inferred from circum-
stances inconsistent with the intention to perform. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The only evidence that would support a surrender by operation 
oF law was given by Peay in his statement that Tolman was going 
co turn the keys over to him. (R. 275). However, the keys, a 
:raditional emblem of surrender of a lease, were never transferred. 
~hat same part of his testimony, Peay indicated that he would 
-7-
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not accept a surrender of th;_c lease when he recalled his SaJi:: 
to Tol:-:-.an: 
... you are still on the lease and as long as we 
don't have it leased to somebody else you are re-
sponsible for th~ lease on it. (R. 275). 
Mr. Tolman's testimony shows that his intent was not to ef~cta 
surrenier, but merely to enlist Mr. Peay's help in effecting a 
sale o~ his business and an assigment of the lease. Peay also 
indica~ed in his testimony that he v1as going to help Tolman leo:: 
the ?remises; 
I said "All right, you take the keys and keep 
them then, and as soon as you are through with 
them I want you to bring them back to me so that 
I can show it when these people come to rent it. 
(R. 275). 
The i:-;::ent of both parties is thus ma.de clear that there 'deS:,; 
surrenjer intended, and that the lease was regarded by both as· 
full ::orce. 
Since there 'das no consentual surrender of the premises b:· 
the te:-:tan ts, the landlord's remedy is to proceed through the 
forci;:;le entry and detainer statute to regain possession. This 
was not done. Instead, Peay changed the locks on the buildi~: 
and r..ade a ne1.; lease with de::endants Hall and Hostetter. (R.;: 
Peay is thus clearly guilty of a forcible entry under the sta:·::f 
His actions constitute a forcible entry by stealth under the r.:: 
stat'J;:e. 
:::3.ses 11here dispossessior. has been eff<?cted by the cha~q:· 
of lcc~s are numerous jurisjictions, and those 
have ;:;een found to be forcibl'" C't!tries, even under statutes 
· 1 h · · Call. forni-' · lacking the forclble entry ~; stea t. provlslon. 
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cases. See ::a:-:o v. i•largolis, 159 CA2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958) 
and \hnchestcr v. Bec~er, 4DA 382, 88 P. 296 (1905). 
In the ~osence of any evidence establishing consentual 
s'JU2nder of the premises, noting that the provisions of the 
iease for repossession were not met, it is clear that Mr. Peay's 
t~ing control of the premises was a forcible entry by stealth 
•Jnder U.C.A. § 76-36-l. 
The damages following such action are easily predictable. 
jithout an interest in the property, it would be practically 
impossible to sell the personal property or the business itself 
~r any amount approximating the fair market value. This is 
accentnated by the difference in prices cited by Tolman at the 
trial. (R. 219). 
For the above reasons, appellants believe it is obvious that 
::e£enda:1t Peay forcibly entered the premises possessed by the 
:Jlabtiffs and did so without legal right or justification. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY OF THE PL.l\INTIFFS WAS CONVERTED BY ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The Utah law of conversion has been succinctly summarized in 
Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958): 
A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lav:ful justification 
by which ~he person entitled thereto is deprived 
of its use and possession. The measure of damages 
of conversion is the full value of the property. 
?cc , con ver.~ ion to be found, there rnus t be a willful interference 
·lth the po:osession and use of a chattel. "~Hllful" is defined 
~~ -2an1ng a consciO'J.S act and 'interference' means an act so 
riu•l·> that the ,,c:rty so converting may be required to, in 
-9-
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effect, purchase the goods. 
The evidence Hils clec.r in this case that Pe>ay assumed contro 
of the goods allegedly converted. Peay admit ted that the equipJ' 
and furnishings associated '•lith the business were still in the 
buildiEg at the time he changed the locks. (R. 292). Defendant 
Hall also testified that he understood Peay owned the proper~ 
when he and Hostetter purchased the property: 
t·lr. Le· . ., is 
t-!r. Hall 
Did you purport to be purchasing that 
Property? 
l·;e thought that was part of the building. 
(R. 243, 244). 
Mr. Hall He was selling us the property as listed 
in thi.s agreement. I don't recall if he 
ca:-:•e right out in the words "I o·.vn the 
rroper~y," but in the agreemeEt it said 
tn::~t he •:1as selling it to us. (;::t. 257). 
Of co'.l:c·se, l·Lc. Peay' s action in changing the locks on the 
building wrongfully deprived Tolman of his rightful use and 
possession of the furnishings and equipment inside. As Tolm~ 
testified, it was also impossible for him to shaH the premises tc 
prospective buyers of his business. (R. 213). Peay further 
deprived Hr. 1'olman of the use and possession of his property b,. 
selling it to Hall and Hostetter. A check dra\vn on their accou:.: 
was given to Peay to cover an "equipment payment" of $200.00. 
Peay admi~ted receiving the payment for the equipment. (R. 237, 
Ex. l4). 
Peay claims he did not knm·l of l'lr. Tolman's interest in t/>i 
property at the time he 'sol6.' it to Hall and Hostetter and thac 
as soon as he beca::1e a•.vare of his interest, he had them deal 
directly ~ith the Restaurant Stores and Equipment Co. 
undce:c Uta.>-t l3.·.v, even a bo:oa :'ide c~ellcr of propsrty is guiltY 0 
-10-
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p:z 
As stated i~ Allred v. Hinc~l?v, 8 Utah2d at 76, 328 
?.2c: :ot: 729 (1958): 
A purchaser of stolen goods or an auctioneer who 
sells them in good faith becomes a converter since 
his acts are an interference with the control of the 
property or in other words, a claiming of the owner-
ship in such property and taking it out of the 
oossession of someone else with intention of excer-
~ising dominion over it is a conversion. 
Th~ essence of conversio~ is the interference with the property 
of another, not the state of mind of the one claiming dominion 
over ~~e property. Therefore, Hall and Hostetter are also guilty 
0 ~ a conversion by reason of the same transaction. 
Thus a bona fide purchaser of goods for value front 
one who has no right to sell the~ becomes a con-
verter when he takes possession of such goods. 
~'-::.2.~., at 7 2 9 • 
Conversion of the furnishings and eqGipment owned by Mr. Tolman 
~as ~a~e by Peay when he interfered with Tolman's use and possession 
t; loc~~ng him out of the building, and conversion was made by 
~11 and Hostetter when they purchased and took possession of the 
?ros>ert:y in the transaction with Peay. Peay's conduct was wrongful 
in tha~ he gained possession of the preDises and property by a 
Hro~,gful eviction. 
The defendants maintained at the trial that some sort of 
:Jci"·}'- denar.d is required in order to alle0e conversion. It is 
~ell established that no demand is necessar~ as a condition 
~re~e~ent to a suit for conversion when the original taking of 
Generally, demand a~d refusal ars unnecessary when 
t~~ act of tha defend~nt amoun~s to a conversion 
re~~lrdless of ',lhether a demand is r.lade. Thus, no 
~ -, ~ ::nd 1 s ncce:;sar'' t.·;hen the co:1·7ersion results fran 
the defDndant's se~urinq possession of the property 
: i ]c~~ ;a !_l .. or~ toc-tiouc.l':,: .. 18 _c.:-~.;-ur. 2d Conversion § 63. 
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No demand is necessary for the cause of action to accrue against 
t1r. Peay; it accru~cl when he wroil.gfully excluded Mr. Tolman from 
the leased property, and thus from his personal property. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter \vere bona fide purch 
for value, a demand is necessary for a suit to be brought agai~ 
them, with a refusal on thier part. 
When there has been no Hrongful taking or disposal 
of the goods, and the defendant has merely come 
rightfully into possession and then refused to sur-
render them, demand and refusal are necessary to 
the existence of the tort. William Prosser, Law 
of Torts, 89. 
That the required demand was made of them, and that there 
was a refusal to deliver the property Has made is established ~ 
testimony at the trial. (R. 107-109). 
Because the defendants willfully interfered with the chattel 
of the plaintiffs within the legal meaning of those terms, the 
trial court erroneously denied plaintiffs' claims for conversioo. 
Because the facts produced at trial, including the admissions of 
the defendants, clearly show conversion, the plaintiffs are 
entitled to judgment from the defendant for the fair market value 
of the property, which is the proper remedy under Utah law. 
POINT III 
THE MvARD OF $1,2 50. 0 0 FOR DELINQUENT RENT WAS EXCESSIVE. 
The terms of the lease agreement provided for payments of 
$400.00 per month during the year 1975. The monthly payment was 
to increase to $450.00 for the year 1976, and, consistent wi~ 
that provision, a payment for last month's rent Has to become d~ 
on March 15, 1975. 
The Lessees shall pay to the Lessor during the 
original term of this lease ... 
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Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) on or before the 
lst d~y of January, 1975, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged, and $400.00 on or before 
the first day of each month thereafter during the 
entire year 1975 ... 
Provided further that on or before the 15th day 
of March, 1975, the Lessees shall pay to the Lessor 
$450.00 which shall constitute payment for the 
last month's rent under the terms of this lease. 
(Ex. 11.) 
That the first payment for January 1975 was made is attested 
to in the leQse itself. Tolman testified at the trial that he 
had made the payment, and Peay also testified that he received 
that payment. ( See Record 208, 273). The trial court found 
that that pay~ent had been made. (R. 11). 
The Febr~ary payment was not made, again established by the 
testimony of both Tolman and Peay. (R. 102, 168). The same 
testimony also established that a March payment was not made. 
1-!r. Toll'la:1' s liability for the March rent, however, was affected 
by Peay's actio:1s denying him access to the premises. Evidence 
established that Mr. Tolman was denied access to the premises on 
March 12, 1975 by Mr. Peay, who had the locks changed. Mr. Tolman 
and Mr. Peay both agreed on this in their testimony. (R. 213, 
216, 277). The court's conclusion is consistent with that evidence 
in fiPding the locks were changed as of that date. 
Mr. Tolrna:1 is not liable for rent for the period following 
his dispossession inasmuch as he was wrongfully excluded from the 
premises. It is a rule of long standing (see Hyman v. Jockey Club, 
9 Colo.App. 299, 48 P. 671 (1897) that a tenant is not liable for 
rent. ·-2'11c:tininc; in an une;.;pired term when there has been a ,,;rongful 
eviction. 49 ~".Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant, §§ 323, 329. Had the 
c,r:'~ for /.!arc~, been paid, the tenant Tolman could have maintained 
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an action in tort to reco,rer the pro rata rent for the unexpired 
term. Tolman should thus be liable for 12/31 of the March rent 
of $400.00; or $154.80. 
0!1 his counterclaim, defendant Peay was also awarded $450.oo 
as the amount due on l1arch 15, 1976 as a last month's rent. This 
would be duplicative of any amount awarded for March inasmuch as ' 
~arch was the last month the lease was in effect. The award of 
$450.00 as a last month's rent was clearly erroneous as being 
duplica~ive. The award of that amount was also improper since 
that liability did nto accrue until the 15th of l1arch, three ~% 
after the effective termination of the lease. Regardless of the 
prop::::-iety of the eviction on the 12th, it is the rule that any 
evictio:-~ suspends liability for rents accruing after the eviction. 
49 Am.Jur2d Landlord & Tenant, § 575. As ahs been said by the 
Colorado court: 
It is well settled that termination of the lease 
agreement of eviction of the tenant by the land-
lord relieves the tenant from all liabilities to 
accrue in the future including rent ... MacArthur 
v. Rostek, 483 P.2d 1351 (Colo.App. 1971). 
The termination of the tenant's possession relieves him of furt)s: 
liabilities to the landlord if that dispossession has been ca~~ 
oy the landlord. Here it is clear and admitted that Mr. Tolman 
did :1ot have access to the premises after the 12th of l'larch 1vhen 
the landlord (Peay) changed the locks on the building. There 
should !"lOt be any liability for payments accruing after that 
date. The reasoning behind the rule is simply the application o' 
the principle of quid pro quo. 
The rule follows the general principle that any 
act of the landlord which results in dispossessing 
the tenant and which deprives him of the use, oc-
cupancy, and enjoyment of the premises amounts to 
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an eviction. The reason for the rule is that the 
rent is the landlord's right to receive from the 
tenant compe~sation for the benefits that are ac-
cruing to the tenant from his possession and enjoy-
~ent of land, and that when the tenant is deprived 
of this right of possession and enjoyment by the 
action of the landlord to receive comoensation 
automatically ceases. Telegraph Ave .• Corp. v. 
Raentsch, 269 P. 1109, 1112, (Cal. S. C. 1928). 
It is clear that any finding that established that Mr. Tolman 
was e~cluded from the premises as of March 12, 1975 demands that 
no liability be placed on him for rents accruing after that date. 
The sa~e effect would occur if a surrender of the lease was 
four.:1. Petersen v. Hodges, 239 21 Utah 72, 239 P.2d 180 (1951). 
In suDGary, liability for February, 1975, may be imposed in 
the a~CJ·.ln': of $400.00. For :-larch, 1975, the amount mving would 
be 5~54.80. Rent is not due for the remainder fo Harch due to 
>lr. ?eay' s •.·.Tongful eviction of ;.:r. Tolman. The payment which 
woul~ have accrued on the 15th of March is not collectible because 
the ::;a::r:1ent would duplicate the pay:nent for March rent and also 
beca.lse that liability had not accrued when possession was denied 
Tolrs.:~. 
cm;cLus ro::.: 
'::he fact of this case clearly show that the defendant Peay 
was ;Jilty o£ forcible entry and that all of the defendants 
conve=ted ~he personal property of the plaitniffs. Appellants 
beL2·'·2 that the clear \·reight of the evidGnce at trial shmved the 
~g~:si~e ~acts to establish these causes of action and that the 
tri·~ ~OG~t simply er=ert in applying Utah law to the facts. 
~~c::_-:.2 o: ~r,e clarit~' of the la·.: and because the defendants' 
',c~c: ='=clrl·: fit 1vithi.;1 th"' limits of the behavior prohibited by 
-'.. J',-;, a~-pcllants that this Court reverse the trial court 
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and enter judgment as previously set forth in this brief. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day fo June, 1976. 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellant! 
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defend~~ 
Respondent, 55 East Center Street, Provo, Utah 84601; Boyd 1. 
Park, Co-counsel for Ellis Y. Peay, Defendant-Respondent, 80 
North 100 East, Provo, Utah 84601; and Richard L. Maxfield, 
Attorney for Gordon Hall and Kenneth Hostetter, Defendant-Respo~c' 
P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601, this /tJkctay of June, 1976. 
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